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ABSTRACT
Forum shopping by patent litigants is nothing new. However, in recent
years, there has been an increase in forum shopping by patentee plaintiffs.
Because of this forum shopping phenomenon, the Eastern District of Texas,
a technological backwater, is on pace to become the leading patent docket
in the United States. This Article empirically analyzes the reasons for the
popularity of the Eastern District among patentee plaintif and considers a
number of possible legislative solutions to the problem of forum shopping
gone awry.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been called a "lawyer's dream,"' 1 a "plaintiffs best bet," 2 a
"haven for patent pirates," 3 a "hotbed for patent trolls," 4 and even a
"renegade jurisdiction." 5  One local attorney described it as "a cross
between 'Hee Haw' and 'Twin Peaks.' 6 Welcome to Marshall, Texas, a
tranquil town of 25,000 not far from the Louisiana border, about 150 miles
east of Dallas. Until recently, this self-proclaimed Pottery Capital of the
World was known mainly for its annual Fire Ant Festival and as the former
home of George Foreman and Lady Bird Johnson. In the past few years,
however, this former railroad hub named after the fourth Chief Justice of
the United States, John Marshall, transformed itself into a veritable
juggernaut of national and international high-tech patent litigation. It took
only five years for Marshall to grow from a tiny speck on the national
litigation map to the second-busiest patent docket in the country, ahead of
New York, Chicago, Washington and San Francisco and closely trailing
Los Angeles, the perennial leader of IP litigation. If it maintains its current
growth rate, the Eastern District of Texas, where Marshall is located, will
likely surpass the Central District of California in 2007 to become the new
national leader in patent litigation. This phenomenon has not gone
unnoticed; commentators have recognized the curious disconnect between
Marshall's utterly unremarkable outward appearance and the important role
it plays in shaping the future of global technology.
7
Despite the wealth of journalistic accounts, one is hard pressed to
find a thorough, systematic study of what has led to Marshall's rise in the
patent litigation arena and whether this rise is good or bad for the patent
system. With this Article, I attempt to fill this void. In Part I, I discuss
forum shopping, generally and specifically in the context of patent
litigation. I review past statistical studies which seek to identify the reasons
behind forum shopping in patent litigation, and I then present my own
empirical findings, highlighting new trends in forum shopping among
patent litigators. In Part II, I discuss patent litigation in the Eastern District
of Texas, presenting both plaintiffs' and defendants' perspectives on the
I Brenda Sandburg, The Marshall Plan, RECORDER, June 16, 2003 (quoting a Howrey
Simon Arnold & White partner describing Marshall as "a lawyer's dream.... a fair, fast
court, a knowledgeable court... a luxury").
2 Eastern District of Texas: A Plaintiff's Best Bet, IP LAW360, Dec. 9, 2005.
3 Sam Williams, A Haven for Patent Pirates, TECH. REV., Feb. 3, 2006.
4 Peter Lattman, Patent Trolls: Grazing the Piney Woods?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Mar.
27, 2006.
5 HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, PATENT LITIGATION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
July 2006 (quoting Justice Scalia during the oral argument of the recent MercExchange,
L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), lawsuit).
6 See Sandburg, supra note 1.
7 Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, at
C1.
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current situation. In Part III, I highlight common problems caused by forum
shopping, and in Part IV, I discuss possible alternatives to the U.S. system
of patent adjudication and various reform proposals put forth in recent
years. Finally, I present my major conclusions.
I. FORUM SHOPPING
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND
"Forum shopping" is a litigant's "practice of choosing the most
favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard." 8 In no
way unique to patent litigation, forum shopping is encountered wherever the
applicable rules of civil or criminal procedure provide a choice of where to
bring suit. Forum shopping can be vertical or horizontal. Vertical forum
shopping refers to the choice to file suit in either federal or state court in a
particular jurisdiction, whereas horizontal forum shopping refers to the
choice between different jurisdictions-different federal districts or
different state courts. Since patent litigation constitutes a subset of civil
litigation, I am not concerned with criminal procedure here. As a general
matter, the rules of civil procedure dictate that a civil lawsuit may be
brought in any court having personal and subject matter jurisdiction, as long
as venue requirements are met. Under the U.S. patent statute, federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over all patent infringement matters,9 with the
exception of cases where patent infringement is a secondary issue in a much
broader controversy dominated by state issues such as unfair competition or
trade secrets. 10  Thus, in the vast majority of patent infringement cases,
vertical forum shopping does not occur, and the patentee plaintiffs only
choice is between different district courts. Because all federal district courts
have original subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases, personal
jurisdiction and venue are the two primary determinants of where a patent
lawsuit may properly be brought.
Personal jurisdiction generally exists where the defendant has had
"minimal contacts"11 with the forum and has "purposefully availed himself'
of commercial benefits from his affiliation with the forum. 12  "The
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state must be such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."' 13  The
purpose of these requirements is to provide notice to prospective defendants
that, by engaging in certain types of commercial activities, such as selling,
advertising, or licensing products to residents of a particular forum, they are
8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 666 (7th ed. 1999).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
'0 Id. § 1338(b).
" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
12 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985).
13 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
2006-2007
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subjecting themselves to the risk of litigation in that forum. 14 As a result, a
company that attempts to sell its products nationally satisfies the personal
jurisdiction requirements in most forums.
While personal jurisdiction is meant to ensure that the court has
legal authority over the litigants, venue rules are designed to promote
fairness and efficiency by requiring that a suit be litigated where most
convenient for both parties. Under the special patent venue statute, "[a]ny
civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business" (emphasis
added).' 5  According to the general venue statute, a corporate defendant
resides "in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction
at the time the action is commenced."' 16  Historically, the patent venue
statute was distinct from the general venue statute; however, in VE Holding
Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held that the general venue statute's definition of "reside"
also applies to the patent venue statute, 17 thereby subjecting large corporate
defendants to patent infringement lawsuits in every federal district where
they are subject to personal jurisdiction. The important practical
implication of this holding is that most large national corporations may now
be sued for patent infringement in virtually any of the ninety-four federal
district courts. 18
B. PATENT LITIGATION
Patent litigation constitutes a relatively small fraction of overall civil
litigation. 19 However, despite the small number of cases, patent litigation
has been growing rapidly in recent years as more and more high-tech,
biotech and pharmaceutical companies expend millions of dollars to protect
their patent portfolios. As shown in Table 1, the number of new patent
infringement cases doubled between 1993 and 2004. Despite the temptation
14 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (holding that personal
jurisdiction requires that the defendant commit some act demonstrating that it expressly
aimed its conduct at the forum state).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2006).
16 Id. § 1391(c).
17 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
18 LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 12
(2d ed. 2001).
19 In recent years, patent infringement cases have comprised a little more than 1% of all
civil cases filed in federal district courts in the United States. See U.S. COURTS JUDICIAL
FACTS & FIGURES, tbl.4.1, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table40I.pdf
(last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (showing that 253,273 cases were filed in federal district courts
in 2005); id. at tbl.4.7, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table4O7.pdf (last
visited Apr. 24, 2007) (showing that 2720 federal district court cases filed in 2005 were
patent infringement actions).
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to blame this increase on the growing litigiousness of corporate America,
there appears to be a strong correlation between the number of patent cases
filed in federal district courts in a given year and the number of new patent
applications filed in that year. The number of patent applications filed also
doubled between 1993 and 2005 (see Fig. 1). The correlation is a bit less
striking between the number of patent cases filed and the number of new
patents granted, but the data shows 80% growth in the number of patent
issuances over the 12-year period. It seems likely that the strong growth in
patent litigation reflects the rise of more tech-based businesses or perhaps
the rising importance of intellectual property for existing companies.
Considering that many patent lawsuits are "bet the company" cases,
20
companies spare no expense on legal services, spending an average of
$2,000,000 per lawsuit.
21
Table 1: New patent applications, patents granted and patent infringement
cases filed in federal district courts, 1993-2005.22
Year Patent applications Patents granted Infringement
cases filed
1993 188,739 109,746 1,553
1994 206,090 113,587 1,617
1995 228,238 113,834 1,723
1996 211,013 121,696 1,840
1997 232,424 124,069 2,112
1998 260,889 163,144 2,218
1999 288,811 169,086 2,318
2000 315,015 175,979 2,484
2001 345,732 183,972 2,520
2002 356,493 184,376 2,700
2003 366,043 187,015 2,814
2004 382,139 181,302 3,075
2005 417,508 157,717 2,720
20 See, e.g., Matthew B. Lowrie, Critical Issues in Managing Patent Litigation, 44 IDEA
267, 268 (2004) (stating that patent litigation has "seen explosive growth in recent years"
and characterizing patent cases as "bet-the-company cases.)
21 A 2003 survey of the American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association found that
"the average cost of bringing a patent litigation is almost US$2 million." Playing
"Patentopoly", PAT. WORLD, Sept. 2004.
22 The totals include utility, design and plant patents. The data were gathered from the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office's U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART, CALENDAR YEARS
1963-2005, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us stat.htm (last visited Apr.
24, 2007), and from the U.S. COURTS JUDICIAL FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 19, at tbl.4.7.
2006-2007
6
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 9 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol9/iss1/6
OF FIRE ANTS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Figure 1: Relationships between the number of patent infringement cases
filed in federal district courts and the number of patent applications filed
(left) and between the number of patents granted and patent infringement
cases filed in federal district court (right), 1993-2005.
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1. Professor Moore's Study (1995-1999)
In light of the importance of patent litigation and the special
jurisdictional and technical issues that set it apart from most run-of-the-mill
property disputes, it seems crucial to understand what factors affect the
choice of jurisdiction in patent litigation and whether these factors remain
fairly constant or change over time. In 2001, Professor Kimberly Moore
23
23 In 2006, Professor Moore was nominated and confirmed as the newest - and
youngest Federal Circuit Judge. Judicial Nominations, at http:/www.whitehouse.gov/
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published an empirical study addressing these very questions. 24 The study
examined whether the creation of the Federal Circuit, which eliminated the
possibility of patent forum shopping at the appellate level, affected patent
forum shopping at the trial court level. The results clearly showed that
forum shopping was alive and well, with almost half of all litigation
concentrated in the top ten districts (Table 2). The study identified certain
procedural and substantive differences in district court adjudication of
patent cases which appeared to have a major impact on litigation.
25
Table 2: Comparison of civil and patent caseloads in the top ten patent
districts, 1995-1999.26
Rank District Numiber of %V of All U.S. %V of All U.S. Ratio of %V
Patent Cases Patent Cases Civ il Cases Patent Cases to
'V Civ il Cases
1 C.D. Cal. 870 9.1 4.2 2.2
2 N.D. Cal. 606 6.3 2.3 2.7
3 N.D. Il. 569 5.9 3.4 1.7
4 S.D.N.Y. 394 4.1 4.1 1.0
5 D. Mass. 319 3.3 1.4 2.4
6 D. Del. 308 3.2 0.3 10.7
7 S.D. Fla. 302 3.1 2.5 1.2
8 E.D. Va. 288 3.0 1.7 1.8
9 D.N.J. 286 3.0 2.6 1.2
10 D. Minn. 276 2.9 1.0 2.9
Professor Moore's study focused on the 9615 patent cases that were
terminated between 1995 and 1999 and on the 1409 patent cases that went
to trial from 1983 (the year following the establishment of the Federal
Circuit) to 1999. Moore found that patent litigation was not evenly
distributed across the ninety-four federal district courts. If litigation had
been evenly distributed, each district court would have handled roughly 100
patent cases in the five-year period. Instead, we observe a very top-heavy
distribution where the top five districts (Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Chicago, New York and Boston) account for 29% of all patent cases, and
the next five districts account for another 15%, bringing the total for the top
ten districts to 44% of all cases. Moreover, according to my research, in the
ten years between 1996 and 2006, the top twenty-five patent jurisdictions
accounted for about 75% of all patent infringement cases filed in the United
24 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889 (2001).
25 See id. at 892.




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 9 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol9/iss1/6
OF FIRE ANTS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
States.
27
Although these numbers are impressive, they do not tell the whole
story. If, say, 44% of the U.S. population resided in the top ten districts,
and 44% of all civil cases were filed in the same ten districts, then the
uneven distribution of patent cases across the federal district courts would
represent nothing more than a demographic trend. To address this
possibility, Moore compared the number of patent infringement cases to the
number of civil cases filed over the same time period in each district.
Interestingly, the top ten districts accounted for only 23.5% of all civil
cases, almost half the percentage of their patent caseload. Granted, some
districts appeared more "normal" than others. For example, New York,
Miami and New Jersey all had ratios close to 1.0, meaning that their patent
caseloads were proportional to their civil caseloads. At the other end of the
spectrum was Delaware, which accounted for 3.2% of all patent cases but
only 0.3% of all civil cases, resulting in a ratio of 10.7. Thus, demographic
trends alone could not explain the abnormal distribution of patent cases.
Another possibility was that certain districts were homes to centers
of technological innovation (for example, Silicon Valley in the Northern
District of California), producing greater numbers of patents and, as a direct
consequence, more patent litigation. To test this hypothesis, Moore
compared the percentage of patents granted to inventors in a state with the
corresponding percentage of patent litigation cases brought in that state
(Table 3). Moore found that the ratio of percentages of patent cases to those
of patents granted was close to 1.0 for many states, including the leading
states (California, New York, Illinois and Massachusetts). Once again,
Delaware was the outlier, with five times more patent cases than one would
have predicted based on the number of patents granted to local inventors.
Virginia was also on the high side with a 2.5 ratio of cases to patents
granted. Notably, some states, such as New Jersey, had abnormally low
ratios, meaning that patent litigation there was low relative to the amount of
technological innovation.
Table 3: Comparison of the numbers of cases and patents granted (by
state), 1995-1999.28
Ranking by # State yo o f All % of All U.S. Ratio of %Y Patent
of P1atenits P1atenits Patent Cases Cases to Patents
Granted Granted in U.S. Granted
I California 18.6 18.7 1.0
2 New York 7.9 7.7 1.0
3 Texas 7.0 6.8 1.0
27 From 1996 to 2006, 18,348 out of 24,440 patent infringement cases were filed in the
top twenty-five jurisdictions (data collected from Lexis Courtlink).
28 See Moore, supra note 24, at 904; 1 have modified the table to remove the number of
patents granted in each state and to add the ratio column.
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4 New Jersey 4.9 3.0 0.6
5 Illinois 4.8 6.4 1.3
6 Michigan 4.7 3.6 0.8
7 Pennsylvania 4.5 3.4 0.8
8 Ohio 4.2 3.6 0.9
9 Massachusetts 4.1 3.3 0.8
10 Florida 3.4 5.3 1.6
11 Minnesota 3.0 2.9 1.0
21 Virginia 1.3 3.2 2.5
32 Delaware 0.6 3.2 5.3
Thus, it appears that none of the simple answers provide a wholly
satisfying explanation. Theoretically, a litigant may be guided by multiple
factors in choosing a particular forum. Such factors include the reputation
of a district's judges and their experience in patent matters, the swiftness of
adjudication in that district, whatever local patent rules exist, the likelihood
of getting to jury trial, the likelihood of winning the case, the leanings of the
local jury pool, the relative reputations of the parties in the district, and the
simple geographic convenience. For example, a patent holder planning to
sue another party for infringement would likely seek a venue with speedy
adjudication, plaintiff-friendly juries, and judges reluctant to grant venue
transfers and summary judgments. An alleged infringer, on the other hand,
might prefer a venue with urban, tech-savvy juries, slower adjudication and
judges more disposed to grant summary judgments. Fortunately, most of
these factors can be quantified. With the wealth of statistical data available,
it is possible to assess the speed of adjudication, the odds of winning a case
or getting summary judgment, the patent expertise of the local judges and
the sophistication of the juries in a particular district. It seems reasonable to
assume that many patent litigators and their consultants engage in this type
of analysis prior to deciding where to file their next lawsuit.
Moore found that the mean time for resolution of all patent cases
between 1995 and 1999 was 1.12 years, with the Eastern District of
Virginia resolving cases fastest in an average of 0.43 years and the Western
District of New York resolving cases slowest, averaging just under two
years. 29  While the finding helped explain the disproportionately high
number of patent cases finding their way to East Virginia, it could not
account for the high rankings of Delaware and Massachusetts, both of
which had been historically slow districts. Moore solved the mystery of
Delaware's high ranking when she examined the fraction of all patent cases
reaching trial. While on average only 5% of all patent cases culminated in
some sort of trial, the fraction of patent cases reaching trial varied widely
among the top ten districts, from as high as 23% in Delaware and 14% in
Eastern Virginia to as low as 1% in New Jersey and Southern California.
30
29 See id. at 907-08.
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Furthermore, while some districts, such as Central and Northern California,
tended to facilitate early case resolution with about 70% of all cases settling
without any court action, other districts, such as Delaware, New Jersey and
East Virginia, had much lower rates of early resolution (30-40% range).31
Another interesting characteristic of the Eastern District of Virginia was its
very high transfer rate (16%), almost three times the national average.
32
The implication of these trends is that plaintiffs who desired a quick
resolution with a low probability of reaching trial would gravitate toward
California; those interested in a quick trial would file in Eastern Virginia,
and those plaintiffs who wanted a trial at all cost, regardless of the time it
took, would look to Delaware for answers. An additional unique advantage
that Delaware has is the fact that many corporate defendants were
incorporated in the district, thus providing a solid foundation for personal
jurisdiction and venue.
Of course, any party to a lawsuit usually wants, first and foremost,
to win. Other factors are only relevant as long as the target district is also
receptive to plaintiff patent holders. In her 2001 study, Moore found that
patent holders won 58% of all patent cases from 1995 to 1999. 33 However,
as was the case with the other factors, different districts showed markedly
different win rates for plaintiffs and defendants. While patent holders in
Northern California won 68% of the time, patent holders in Chicago and
Delaware did not fare nearly as well, winning only 48% and 46% of cases,
respectively. The Eastern District of Virginia was average with a 58%
plaintiffs win rate. Massachusetts, on the other hand, appeared highly
favorable to alleged infringers - patent holders won only 30% of the cases
there. 34 Since Massachusetts was the fifth and Delaware the sixth most
popular patent litigation venue from 1995 to 1999, the obvious question
was: "Why would any sane plaintiffs choose to file cases there, knowing
that the districts' track records were highly unfavorable to them?" One
reason may be that plaintiffs perceived certain other benefits to these
forums that cannot be easily quantified and supported by empirical
evidence. Another possibility may be that the plaintiffs simply had not been
aware of these statistics before the Moore study came out in 2001. Moore
herself wondered how empirical results presented in her article might affect
future forum selection.35 Since it had been years since the publication of
the Moore study, I decided that it was a good time to investigate what
impact, if any, the study had on forum shopping in patent cases.
31 See id. at 911.
32 See id. at 913.
33 See id. at 916.
34 See id. at 917.
35 "Further research should consider why patent holders select these forums and how
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2. Recent Trends in Patent Forum Shopping (2002-2006)
To uncover the recent trends in forum selection for patent
infringement cases, I analyzed 13,522 patent cases filed between January 1,
2002 and November 1, 2006 (see Table 4).
Table 4: Comparison of civil and patent caseloads in the top ten patent
districts, 2002-2006 6
Rank District Numnber of of All U.S. % of All U.S. Ratio of % Patent
Patent Cases Patent Cases Civ il Cases Cases to Civ il Cases
1 C.D. Cal. 1417 10.5% 5.0% 2.1
2 N.D. Cal. 1184 8.8% 2.3% 3.8
3 N.D. II. 751 5.6% 3.6% 1.6
4 D. Del. 623 4.6% 0.5% 8.5
5 S.D.N.Y. 617 4.6% 4.3% 1.1
6 D.N.J. 581 4.3% 2.5% 1.8
7 E.D. Tex. 568 4.2% 1.2% 3.5
8 D. Minn. 374 2.8% 1.9% 1.5
9 D. Mass. 351 2.6% 1.2% 2.1
10 E.D. Mich. 313 2.3% 1.9% 1.2
The first salient observation I made is that patent litigation has
become even more concentrated in the years since Moore's study. The top
ten districts now account for half of all patent cases, with the top five
districts carrying 36% of the caseload. My next observation is that the
leadership has not changed much: eight out of the ten leaders in the Moore
study are still in the top ten, but Eastern Virginia and Southern Florida have
been replaced with Eastern Texas and Eastern Michigan. Delaware has
become even more prominent, with its caseload doubling relative to the
1995-1999 period. Massachusetts, on the other hand, has dropped from the
fifth to ninth place, as its patent caseload remained fairly flat between 2002
and 2006. Since Massachusetts had the lowest plaintiffs' win rate in
Moore's study, it is reasonable to assume that the publication may have
contributed to its drop in the rankings.
However, the biggest story of the last five years is not readily
apparent from the five-year numbers shown in Table 4; it can only be fully
appreciated by looking at the number of patent infringement cases filed
annually (see Table 5). Tucked inconspicuously in the seventh position is
the new superstar of patent litigation districts: the Eastern District of Texas,
which has risen from almost complete judicial obscurity only five years ago
to second place in 2006, ahead of all the perennial favorites except the
Central District of California.
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Table 5: Number of new patent cases filed in the top ten districts from
2002 to 2006. 37
Rank District 2002 2003 2004 2005 2009202-2006
1 C.D. Cal. 250 415 287 240 225 1417
2 N.D. Cal. 281 250 245 247 161 1184
3 N.D. Ill. 184 148 170 138 111 751
4 D. Del. 116 138 145 119 105 623
5 S.D.N.Y. 104 133 150 135 95 617
6 D.N.J. 102 138 111 107 123 581
7 E.D. Tex. 32 5 5 108 159 214 56 8
8 D. Minn. 80 75 84 75 60 374
9 D. Mass. 70 68 79 72 62 351
10 E.D. Mich. 74 68 68 52 51 313
U.S. Total 2710 2914 2933 2663 2302 13522
This achievement is all the more remarkable considering the fact
that overall patent litigation has actually declined in the last two years,
which is reflected in the lower 2005-2006 numbers in almost every district
- except in Eastern Texas. The data show that the Eastern District of Texas
has been luring patent litigants away from other districts, having doubled its
caseload load from 2004 to 2006 while almost every other district
experienced strong declines. With a story so extraordinary, the Eastern
District warrants a separate investigation into what makes it so irresistible to
plaintiff patent holders - besides, of course, the Fire Ant Festival.
II. THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas has
jurisdiction over forty-three counties in eastern Texas, counties located near
the borders with Arkansas and Louisiana. The district has six divisions:
Beaumont, Lufkin, Marshall, Sherman, Texarkana and Tyler, where it is
headquartered. 39 As of the time of this writing, the district has ten District
Judges and six Magistrate Judges. 41  While it is generally true that over
37 The data were collected from Lexis Courtlink. Although the data spans only four
years and ten months, I do not believe the difference between four years and ten months
and five years is significant for the purposes of this Article.
38 The 2006 data cover the period from January 1, 2006 to November 1, 2006.
39 See U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Directories/DistrictInformation/Districtlnformation.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2007).
40 Chief Judge Heartfield, Judges Brown, Clark, Crone, Davis, Folsom, Schell,
Schneider, Steger and Ward. Id.
41 Judges Bush, Craven, Giblin, Guthrie, Hines and Love. Id.
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half of all patent cases in the district are filed in Marshall, a fair amount of
patent litigation has been spilling over to the other divisions as well.
B. PLAINTIFF'S PERSPECTIVE
Plaintiff patent holders and their attorneys love the Eastern District
of Texas. There are three key factors that make Marshall such an
attractive forum: 1) knowledgeable judges experienced in patent cases; 2)
special patent rules that compel open discovery with tight deadlines to
which the judges strictly adhere, resulting in quick and relatively
inexpensive trials; and 3) plaintiff-friendly juries.
43
1. Knowledgeable Judges
Although the Eastern District of Texas has a total of sixteen judges,
the bulk of its patent docket is currently handled by only four: Judges Ward,
Davis, Folsom and Clark (see Table 6). Judge Ward is appointed in
Marshall, Judge Davis in Tyler, Judge Folsom in Texarkana and Judge
Clark in Beaumont/Lufkin. To reduce "judge shopping," any case filed in
Marshall may be assigned to Judge Ward (60% of civil cases), Judge Davis
(30% of civil cases) or Judge Folsom (10% of civil cases). Regardless of
the judge assigned, jury trials of cases filed in Marshall are usually held in
Marshall before local juries.
44
Table 6: Distribution of new patent cases among the district judges in the
Eastern District of Texas (as of Oct. 13, 2006).45
Y'e ar ,Judge WNard Judge D~avis Judge Folsom Judge Clark E.D).Tex. Total
1999 2 -- 2 -- 14
2000 5 -- 5 -- 23
2001 10 -- 7 -- 33
2002 16 6 4 -- 32
2003 24 7 11 1 55
2004 48 25 14 3 108
2005 45 65 30 5 159
2006 63 51 29 44 196
Total 213 157 102 53 620
42 See Shahnaz Mahmud, See Y'all Real Soon!, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Oct. 2006.
43 Michael C. Smith, Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent
Cases, 69 TEX. B.J. 1044, 1045-1048 (2006) (listing and discussing judges, patent rules,
and juries as reasons for Marshall's ascent).44 See HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, supra note 5.
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(a) Hon. T. John Ward
Judge Ward is the patent "rock star" of the Eastern District. He is a
Clinton appointee who serves the Marshall and Texarkana Divisions and
conducts the majority of patent jury trials in the district. A skilled defense
trial lawyer who practiced for thirty years in the Eastern District before
being appointed to the federal bench in 1999, Judge Ward has a genuine
interest in and a deep understanding of patent law.4 6 These qualities are
very rare among today's federal judges, most of whom are put off by the
technical intricacies of a patent trial and by the high reversal rate of patent
cases on appeal. Interestingly, Judge Ward did not practice much patent
law before his appointment, despite his bachelor's degree in applied
chemistry from Texas Tech.47 His one notable brush with patent litigation
came toward the end of his private practice in 1998, when he defended
Hyundai Electronics against the local giant Texas Instruments in a patent
infringement suit.48 Although Ward lost the trial, which resulted in a $25.2
million jury verdict against his client, Marshall lawyers say he was
intrigued by patent law and sought to streamline the litigation process for
patent cases when he took the bench.49
After he was appointed to the bench, Judge Ward spent three years
in Tyler, where in 2001 he adopted the first set of local patent rules,
modeled closely after those of the Northern District of California (see Part
11B2). In 2002, Judge Ward became the resident judge for the Marshall
division. His patent rules were soon adopted throughout the Eastern
District, which helped establish his reputation as a nationally recognized
figure in patent litigation. As shown in Table 6, Judge Ward has presided
over 200 patent cases since 1999, making him one of the most experienced
patent jurists in the country. In 2004, Managing Intellectual Property
magazine acknowledged his accomplishments when it named Judge Ward
one of the fifty most influential people in the world of intellectual
property.
50
(b) Hon. Leonard Davis
Judge Davis is a relatively recent addition to the Eastern District; he
was appointed to the bench in 2002. Although he is the resident judge in
Tyler, Judge Davis also serves the Marshall division, sharing 30% of its
civil case load. He holds a bachelor's degree in mathematics from the
46 Dick Dahl, IP Plaintiffs Flocking to Small Town of Marshall in Eastern Texas, KAN.
CITY DAILY NEWS-PRESS, June 6, 2006.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. As a curious side note, Judge Ward was quoted as saying "I probably lost more
cases in the courtroom than any defense lawyer you could find." See Sandburg, supra note
1.
50 Editorial, IP's Most Important Figures, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., July/Aug. 2004.
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University of Texas, Arlington, a master's in management from Texas
Christian University, and a law degree from Baylor, where he graduated
first in his class. Judge Davis practiced civil and criminal law for twenty-
three years, after which he served for several years as Chief Justice of the
Twelfth Circuit Court of Appeals of the State of Texas before receiving his
federal judicial appointment. 51 Much like Judge Ward, Judge Davis did not
practice patent law before becoming a judge; however, this did not prevent
him from becoming the second-busiest patent judge in the Eastern District
in a little over four years, with over 150 patent cases assigned.
(c) Hon. David Folsom
Judge Folsom, another Clinton appointee, is the longest-serving
patent judge in the Eastern District, having been the Texarkana resident
judge since 1995. Unlike Judges Ward and Davis, Judge Folsom holds an
undergraduate degree in liberal arts and spent several years working as a
high school history teacher before embarking on a career in the law. Before
he was appointed to the bench, he spent twenty years in private practice,
engaging in various types of civil litigation. Since 1999, Judge Folsom has
dealt with about 100 patent cases, making him the third-busiest patent judge
in the district. Because he lacks a science or engineering background,
Judge Folsom tends to hire clerks with engineering degrees or master's
degrees in intellectual property law. 52
(d) Hon. Ronald Clark
Judge Clark is the most recent addition to the Eastern District patent
group, appointed in 2002 to the Beaumont and Lufkin Divisions to replace
retiring Judge Cobb. Judge Clark received bachelor's and master's degrees
in economics from the University of Connecticut before getting a law
degree from the University of Texas. He started his career as an assistant
city attorney in Abilene, Texas, later moving to a private firm where he
continued to defend local governmental entities in a broad variety of civil
cases. An experienced trial lawyer, he tried over seventy cases, many of
which culminated in a jury trial. 53 As shown in Table 6, Judge Clark's
patent docket has experienced a very steep rise within the last year, growing
from five cases filed in 2005 to fourty-four filed so far this year, a rate of
increase virtually unheard of in any other jurisdiction.
51 Judiciary Nominees: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2002) (Statement of the Honorable Orin Hatch), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-statement.cfm?id 234&wit id 51.
52 Editorial, Judge David Folsom: From Small-Town Beginnings to Technology-Rich
Present, ARK. L. REC., Winter/Spring 2004, at 23.
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2. Special Patent Rules
One of the biggest reasons patent holders gravitate toward Marshall,
Texas is the special patent rules adopted in the Eastern District of Texas,
54
rules modeled after those adopted earlier in the Northern District of
California. The Northern District of California includes San Francisco, San
Jose, and Silicon Valley, and therefore it is home to many prominent high-
technology companies, some of which occasionally engage in patent
litigation. In 1998, the Northern District adopted the first set of rules
specifically addressing patent litigation. These rules, which stress early and
significant disclosure requirements and claim construction,55 were designed
to create a faster, more efficient patent litigation process.
One substantial difference between the Texas and California rules is
that defendants in Eastern Texas only have nine months to complete
discovery, whereas defendants in Northern California get eighteen months.
Another important feature of the Eastern District patent litigation process is
the sanctity of discovery deadlines and trial dates. Barring certain truly
extraordinary circumstances, these dates must be strictly honored and no
routine extensions are allowed. While the system is somewhat biased in the
plaintiff s favor, it is structured to clear the docket and get cases resolved in
a quick and efficient fashion. According to LegalMetric, a legal data
analysis company, bench patent trials in the Eastern District take 22.3
months on average compared to 37.8 months nationwide; jury patent trials
take an average of 21.1 months compared to 27.1 months nationwide.
56
It is important to note that, in addition to the special patent rules,
there are other factors that have accelerated patent litigation in the Eastern
District. First, due to its aging rural demographic, the district has a
relatively small criminal docket, and the criminal docket usually takes
precedence over civil matters in other districts. 57 Second, in 2003, Texas
voters approved Proposition 12, granting the Texas Legislature the authority
54 See The Rules of Practice for Patent Cases before the Eastern District of Texas,
available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/LocalRules/Documents/
Appendix%20M.pdf [hereinafter E.D.P.R.].
55 See Michael C. Smith, Eastern District of Texas Patent Rules 3, 2004 AIPLA Spring
Meeting (March 19, 2004), http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern district of texas/
2004 patent rules ed texas.pdf ("The rules provide a complex series of dates directed at
the early stages of a patent case, specifically the claim construction process. Judges of the
Northern District of California have explained that: 'The patent local rules were adopted by
this district in order to give claim charts more 'bite.' The rules are designed to require
parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in the litigation and to adhere to those
theories once they have been disclosed. . . . Unlike the liberal policy for amended
pleadings, the philosophy behind amending claim charts is decisively conservative, and
designed to prevent the 'shifting sands' approach to claim construction."').
56 See Mahmud, supra note 42.
51 Monica Perin, Town Practices "Rocket Docket" Law: Tiny Marshall Gaining Fame




LEYCHKIS: OF FIRE ANTS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
9 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 193
to impose caps on non-economic (i.e. pain-and-suffering) damages in health
care liability actions. 58 As a direct consequence of this legal development,
the number of medical malpractice lawsuits filed in Marshall, Tyler and
other Eastern District divisions has dropped precipitously.
59
Although the Eastern District of Texas is clearly quicker to resolve a
typical patent infringement case (if there is such a thing) than the average
federal district court, especially in a bench trial, its patent docket has been
slowing in recent years as the judges are inundated with more and more new
cases. Some commentators have noted similarities with the Eastern
District of Virginia, the original "rocket docket," which experienced a
similar wave of popularity among patent litigators in the 1990s but was
soon forsaken when the docket slowed down.61 In contrast, despite the
recent slowing, patent case filings in Marshall continue their exponential
growth, suggesting that speed is not the most important factor at play here.
In the meantime, similar patent rules have been adopted in the Northern
District of Georgia (Atlanta) and the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Pittsburgh), in an effort to attract more patent litigation.62 So far, however,
the effect of these new rules in those districts appears to have been




To say that juries in the Eastern District of Texas favor patent
holders is something of an understatement - quite plainly, an Eastern
District jury is the patentee plaintiff s best friend. Patentees have won 90%
of all jury trials in the district between 1998 and 2006 (see Table 7).64
58 Texas Medical Ass'n, Texans Vote "Yes on 12", TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, at
http://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id-2819 (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
59 See Williams, supra note 3.
60 See Tresa Baldas, Texas IP Rocket Docket Headed for Burnout?, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
28, 2004; see also Allen Pusey, Patent Lawyers Flock to East Texas Court, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 25, 2006 (recognizing that Marshall patent cases that used to take
eight to twelve months to resolve are now taking twenty to twenty-four months).
61 See Baldas, supra note 60.
62 See JONES DAY COMMENTARIES, FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IN PITTSBURGH ADOPTS
SPECIALIZED LOCAL RULES FOR PATENT CASES (2005), http://www.jonesday.com/
services/services pubs.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2007). The Northern District of Geogria
patent rules are available online at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/documents/
NDGARulesPatent.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) and the Western District of
Pennsylvania patent rules are available online at http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/
Documents/Forms/LocalPatentRules.pdf (last Apr. 24, 2007).
63 See Roderick McKelvie & Scott Weidenfeller, Pennsylvania Bids for Patent
Litigation, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Mar. 2005 (noting that, whereas E.D. Tex. patent
infringement filings more than doubled from fifty in 2003 to 103 in 2004, N.D. Ga. saw a
more modest increase, from forty-five in 2003 to sixty-one in 2004).
64 The data were collected from Lexis and Westlaw databases of jury verdicts and
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Compare that to the nationwide figure of 68%,65 and you have got an
extremely patentee-friendly venue. So friendly, in fact, that before June
2006, patentees won every single jury trial in the district, before the
defendants' dry spell was finally broken with two back-to-back victories
66
(see Table 7). What is even more remarkable is that it has taken eighteen
years of patent infringement trials for an Eastern District jury to find a
patent invalid; it happened for the first time ever in the 2006 case Hyperion
Solutions Corp. v. OutlookSoft Corp.
6 7
Table 7: Outcomes of patent jury
1999-2006.68
trials in the Eastern District of Texas,
see, e.g., Bob Cote & Rodger Sadler, Survival Strategies in the New IP Economy,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. at 26, June 2006 (reporting that patentees won 92% of all jury
trials in the district); see also Alan Cohen, From PI to IP, IP L. & Bus., Nov. 2005 at 36
(quoting LegalMetric reports that plaintiffs won 88% of all jury trials in the Eastern District
of Texas since 1994).
65 See Cohen, supra note 64 (quoting nationwide data from LegalMetric).
66 The defendants' victories were in Sensormatic Elecs. Corp. v. WG Security Prods.,
Inc., No. 2:04-CV-167, 2006 WL 2325361 (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2006), and Hyperion
Solutions Corp. v. OutlookSoft Corp., No. 2:04-CV-436 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2006).
67 422 F. Supp. 2d 760; see Creswell, supra note 7.
68 The case data were collected from Lexis, Westlaw and other online sources.
Case Namne Date Judge/Division Prevailing Patent
party Damages 6 "
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. 3/25/1999 Heartfield/Marshall Plaintiff $25,200,000
Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co.
70
Edmark Indus. v. Azad Int'l, 7/17/2000 Cobb/Beaumont Plaintiff $326,302
Inc. 
1
John D. Watts v. XL Systems, 3/3/2001 Hines/Beaumont Plaintiff $1,675,450
Inc. 72
Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp.7 3  6/3/2001 Brown/Sherman Plaintiff $4,281,000
Imonex Servs., Inc. v. 1/10/2003 Ward/Marshall Plaintiff $10,350,000
WH Munzprufer Deitmar
74
Nat'l Instruments Corp. v. 1/30/2003 Ward/Marshall Plaintiff $3,500,000
The Mathworks, Inc.
75
Microtune (Texas), L.P. v. 3/20/2003 Brown/Sherman Plaintiff $5,650,000
Broadcom Corp. 
76
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. 6/25/2004 Davis/Tyler Plaintiff $24,000,000
v. Smith Int'l, Inc.
77
Brooktrout v. Eicon 11/12/2004 Ward/Marshall Plaintiff $94,500
Networks
78
02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. 11/17/2005 Ward/Marshall Plaintiff $2,000,000
Sumida Corp. 
79
Acco Brands Inc. v. 12/15/2005 Ward/Marshall Plaintiff $2,075,000
ABA Locks Mfr. Co.8 _
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Figure 2 below compares patent holders' jury trial win rates in cases
filed between 1999 and 2004 across several major patent litigation districts.
It is interesting to note that the two districts with the highest patentee win
rates are the ones referred to as the "rocket dockets" - apparently, speedier
trials strongly correlate with higher win rates by patent holders.
69 The table lists original jury awards; some of these awards were later reduced by the
trial judge.
70 No. 98-VC-74, 1999 WL 33491157 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1999).
71 No. 1:98-CV-1530, 2000 WL 33720974 (E.D. Tex. July 17, 2000).
72 No. 99-CV-369, 2001 WL 1824621 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2001).
73 No. 4:98-CV-325 (E.D. Tex. June 3, 2001).
74 No. 2:01-CV-174, 2003 WL 1855363 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2003).
75 No. 2:02-CV-256, 2003 WL 1855301 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2003).
76 No. 4:01-CV-23, 2003 WL 21695675 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2003).
77 No. 4:02-CV-269, 2004 WL 1687064 (E.D. Tex. June 25, 2004).
78 No. 2:03-CV-59, 2004 WL 2921644 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004).
79 No. 2:03-CV-7, 2005 WL 3691550 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2005).
80 No. 2:02-CV-1 12, 2005 WL 3690829 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2005).
81 No. 2:04-CV-211 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2005).
82 No. 2:04-CV-1, 2006 WL 1458443 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2006).
83 No. 6:06-CV-142, 2006 WL 1626711 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2006).
14 No. 2:03-CV-333, 2006 WL 1626701 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2006).
85 No. 2:04-CV-32 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2006).
16 No. 2:04-CV-183, 2006 WL 1889522 (E.D. Tex. May 31, 2006).
87 No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 WL 3246407 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2006).
88 No. 2:04-CV-167, 2006 WL 2325361 (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2006).
89 No. 2:04-CV-436 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2006).
212
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor 12/20/2005 Folsom/Marshall Plaintiff $4,600,000
Corp. 
81
TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Comms. 4/13/2006 Folsom/Marshall Plaintiff $73,991,964
Corp. 
82
Z4 Techs., Inc. v. 4/19/2006 Davis/Tyler Plaintiff $133,000,000
Microsoft Corp. 
83
Visto Corp. v. 4/28/2006 Ward/Marshall Plaintiff $3,683,000
Seven Networks Inc. 
84
02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. 5/15/2006 Ward/Marshall Plaintiff Not
Beyond Innovation Tech. 85  determined
Avid Identification Systems v. 5/31/2006 Ward/Marshall Plaintiff $26,981
Datamars SA
86
Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV7  6/23/2006 Clark/Beaumont Plaintiff $78,900,000
Sensormatic Elecs. Corp. v. 6/30/2006 Ward/Marshall Defendant $0
WG Security Prods., Inc. 
88
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Figure 2: Comparison of patent holders' win rates in jury trials, 1999-
2004.90
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There are several plausible explanations for the high plaintiffs' win
rate in jury trials. First, Eastern District juries have a tendency to view
patents in much the same way as they view real property. 91 Framed in this
fashion, any patent infringement dispute can be distilled to a simple trespass
action, and any invalidity defense can be viewed as a claim of defective title
- terms that can be easily understood even by an unsophisticated small town
juror. 92 Because a valid title holder has a broad right, within certain legal
limits, to do anything he or she wants to do with the land, including leasing
it out or doing nothing at all, juries in the Eastern District do not see much
difference between a patentee who exploits his or her invention
commercially and a "patent troll," a holding company that exists solely to
license patents to other companies. 93 Thus, any defense arguments based on
the public policy of using the patent system to promote common welfare are
likely to fall on deaf ears in the Eastern District of Texas.
Additionally, according to Marshall attorney Michael C. Smith,
local juries have a great respect for the government and a general distrust of
large corporations, especially foreign ones. 94  As a result, whenever in
doubt, these local juries defer to government agencies, or rule in favor of
90 See Cote & Sadler, supra note 64 (based on Lexis Courtlink data covering the period
between Apr. 1, 1999 and Mar. 31, 2004).
91 Michael C. Smith, "Patent Pirates" Only Exist in Neverland, TEX. LAW., Oct. 11,
2004, at 30.
92 Id.
93 James Nurton, They're Out There Somewhere, MANAGING INTEL. PROP., June 2006
(quoting Michael C. Smith as saying, "Juries are very committed to property rights and
very willing to recognize that someone who has a patent can do what they want.")
94 Susan Decker, Texas District Is Heaven for Patent Holders Under Siege, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 1,2006, at C3.
213
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the small plaintiff. In complex patent matters, Eastern District juries tend to
interpret the presumption of patent validity very rigidly, taking the fact that
the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office issued a patent as conclusive proof that
the patent must be valid, merely because the government knows what it is
doing.95 The distrust of corporate defendants goes back many decades to
the time when the district was a major railroad center, which resulted in
many personal injury claims against large railroad companies. 96 Even long
after the railroads ceased to play the important role they once did, mass tort
claims against the employers persisted, with plaintiffs' wins outnumbering
their losses.
97
The combination of the local juries' respect for personal property
rights and government agencies and their distrust of large corporate
defendants makes the Eastern District of Texas an ideal venue for "patent
trolls." My analysis of all patent cases filed in the Eastern District since
1999 revealed that many such "trolls" have shown a clear preference for the
Eastern District over other venues. 98 It is interesting to note that, in many
instances, the same patent holder gets to litigate most, if not all, of its cases
before the same judge. As I have stated earlier, most patent cases are filed
in Marshall, where a random lottery is used to allocate cases among several
judges. However, cases filed in other Eastern District divisions are
substantially more likely to be heard by the resident judge of that division,
so the plaintiff is well positioned to engage in "judge shopping" if so
inclined. The observation that many "trolls" tend to litigate most of their
cases before the same judge may reflect trolls' perceptions of a strategic
advantage or the efficiency of litigating the same or highly similar issues
before a judge who is already familiar with the technology in dispute.
Whatever the reasons, the data show that for many patent-holding
companies, the Eastern District Texas has become the district of choice.
95 See id.
96 See Creswell, supra note 7.
97 See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 849, 871-72 (1988) (finding a 66% "prevail rate" for mass
tort plaintiffs).
98 See Nurton, supra note 93 (describing the most litigious patent-holding companies
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Table 8: Patent infringement lawsuits initiated by selected patent-holding
companies since 1999.99
Hode Ju dge Jutidg(e Judgd e Jutidge E.D.T. All otherPlaintiff/Patent HlolerP P Wa rd Davis Folsom Clark total districts
Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, LP 1 -- 5 15 21 11
Data Treasury Corp .... 15 -- 15 5
Orion 1P, LLC -- 11 .... 11 1
lAP Intermodal, LLC 11 .. .... 11 --
Rembrandt Technologies, LP 5 .. .... 5 --
Some commentators have also noted that Eastern District juries are
prone to awarding "Texas-size" damages. 100 According to Table 7, six out
of twenty jury trials resulted in damage awards over $10,000,000.
However, in many of these cases, both parties were large corporations that
had spent many years and millions of dollars on the litigation, 10 1 so the
sheer size of these awards is not particularly unusual. As a general matter,
however, most of the patent infringement damages in the Eastern District
are on par with those awarded in other districts.
C. DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
There is no denying it: with an average win rate of just 22%, the
Eastern District of Texas is about the worst place in the country to be a
defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit. 10 2 The same factors that make
the district so appealing to the plaintiff make the defendant's life extremely
difficult. Speedy and predictable patent adjudication refereed by
experienced, knowledgeable judges may benefit both plaintiffs and
defendants equally in theory, but once we step into the defendant's shoes,
we see that practice and theory often fail to align.
99 The data were collected from Lexis Courtlink.
100 See Cresswell, supra note 7 (noting that "jurors here have a history of handing out
Texas-sized verdicts to winners").
101 See, e.g., Texas Instruments v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co., No. 98-CV-74, 1999 WL
33491157 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1999) ($25,000,000); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Comms. Corp.,
No. 4:04-CV-1, 2006 WL 1458443 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2006) ($74,000,000); Finisar Corp.
v. DirectTV, No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 WL 3246407 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2006)
($79,000,000).
102 As a point of reference, the nationwide defendant win rate in patent cases is 41%;
see Creswell, supra note 7 (quoting LegalMetric data showing that plaintiffs prevailed in
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1. Problems with the Judges
(a) Are the Judges Fair?
For all their experience and expertise in patent matters, the judges of
the Eastern District show certain extreme tendencies in their judicial
decision making. For starters, patent holders have won 75% of bench trials
in Marshall since 1994, compared to 47% nationwide. 10 3 In addition, the
district has the lowest rate of summary judgments in patent cases by far:
less than 10% of all summary judgment motions are granted here, compared
to almost 70% in the Northern District of California, 50% in the Central
District of California, and about 40% nationwide. 104 In and of itself, the
low number of summary judgments seems quite innocuous - after all, by
refusing to grant summary judgments, the judges do not seem to show bias
to either party, merely transferring the ultimate fact-finding burden to the
jury. However, given the local juries' well-known track record of
repeatedly finding for the plaintiff, the judges are actually helping to
institutionalize the district's pro-patentee bias.
Similarly, the Eastern District of Texas has one of the lowest rates of
venue transfers granted. While the national average is close to 50%, with
some jurisdictions having much higher rates (e.g., the Southern District of
New York judges grant almost 80% of all transfers), the Eastern District of
Texas grants only one in every three motions to transfer venue. 105 This rate
is about half that of the Eastern District of Virginia, the original "rocket
docket."' 106 Thus, while Eastern Virginia judges countered the onslaught of
patent litigators with a fairly liberal venue transfer policy, the Eastern Texas
judges are holding the fort, so to speak, by refusing to transfer cases based
merely on inconvenience to the defendant or the court's overly busy patent
docket. 107
In cases where an alleged infringer files a motion to stay litigation
pending the outcome of patent reexamination by the Patent Office, the
Eastern District of Texas is in the middle of the pack, granting just over
50% of such motions, compared to a 100% grant rate by judges in the
103 See Cohen, supra note 64 (quoting LegalMetric patent bench trial data covering the
period between 1994 and 2005).
104 See Cote & Sadler, supra note 64 (based on Lexis Courtlink data between June 1,
2003 and June 1,2004).
105 See id. (based on Lexis Courtlink data covering the period between June 1, 2002 and
June 1, 2004).
106 See id.
107 See Cohen, supra note 64 ("At least one defendant... has cited the growing number
of patent cases, and the congestion they could create, as a reason to request a transfer out of
Marshall. In September [2005], Judge Ward denied the company's motion, writing that
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Central District of California and the Southern District of New York. 10 8
Although this is clearly consistent with the district policy of promoting
quick and efficient resolution of patent disputes, it also seems wasteful to
require that parties continue litigation while the Patent Office itself has not
made a final determination regarding the scope of the claims in question.
The combined effect of all these trends is that alleged infringers find
themselves trapped in a district with defendant-hostile juries and scarce
opportunities for transfer, stay or summary judgment. In such an
environment, any reasonable defendant might seriously consider settlement
- and the vast majority of all patent cases in the Eastern District do settle
before trial. 109 Rational reasoning would suggest that defendants with weak
or even intermediate strength positions tend to settle, while only those
defendants who perceive their position to be strong proceed to trial. If this
is true, the dismal win rates by defendants in the Eastern District of Texas
would have been even lower had it not been for the high rate of settlements.
(b) Are the Judges Accurate?
It is clear that, due to the sheer number of patent cases passing
through their courtrooms, the judges of the Eastern District of Texas are
experienced patent jurists. A different question is whether that experience
translates into the increased accuracy of their decisions. Since there is
hardly an objective measure of accuracy in any given area of law, the only
objective readout is the appellate track record of the judges at the Federal
Circuit level. Unfortunately, due to the lengthy appeal process and the
relatively recent explosion in the number of patent cases filed in the Eastern
District, a search revealed only twenty-six Federal Circuit appeal decisions
from Eastern District patent infringement actions. Some of these appeals
addressed procedural issues, and some dealt with substantive patent law
issues such as claim construction or the doctrine of equivalents. Table 9
classifies these appeals by district judge, and Table 10 categorizes them by
year in order to discern potential temporal trends. 110 I remind the reader
that the sample size is very small and therefore the uncertainty level
accompanying my conclusions is high.
Predictably, Judge Ward has the best appellate record, with only one
out of six decisions overruled based on one incorrect claim construction.
Other judges have less admirable records, and the overall reversal rate for
108 See Cote & Sadler, supra note 64, chart 6.
109 See Creswell, supra note 7 (stating that roughly 5% of patent cases eventually make
it to trial in Marshall).
110 Where the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, I counted it as two
separate decisions, which is why the totals in Tables 9 and 10 come to 28 instead of 26.
Judge Clark has not accumulated any appellate record in patent cases; hence, he does not
appear in the tables.
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the district is about 40%, twice the national average of about 20%.111 The
overall numbers appear even less encouraging when we examine claim
construction: almost 50% of all constructions appealed were held erroneous,
significantly higher than the national average of about 35%. 112
Table 9: Recent appellate track record of E.D. Tex. judges in patent cases.
Appellate Rev iewi Judge Judge Judge Other Total
WNa rd Davis Folsom IudeI"
Decisions affirmed 4 1 2 10 17
Decisions reversed 1 0 2 8 11
Correct claim 5 0 3 1 9
constructions
Erroneous claim 1 0 1 6 8
constructions
Table 10 also fails to demonstrate a clear trend toward improved
accuracy. The overall district reversal rate in patent cases oscillated
between 33% and 45%, without a discernable temporal trend. The same is
generally true about claim constructions, which were reversed 40% to 50%
of the time depending on the time frame. Thus, the odds of getting a correct
claim construction in the Eastern District of Texas appear to be about as
good as those one can expect from flipping a coin, not exactly promoting
public confidence in the system.
Table 10: Recent appellate track record of E.D. Tex. judges in patent cases
(by year).
Appellate Result 1988-1998 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2006 Total
Decisions affirmed 3 2 6 6 17
Decisions reversed 2 1 5 3 11
Correct claim 0 0 7 2 9
constructions
Erroneous claim 0 1 5 2 8
constructions
111 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2001) (demonstrating that, from 1995 through 2000,
the overall Federal Circuit reversal rates for patent cases ranged from 13% to 27%,
averaging about 20%).
112 See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.R. 231, 233 (2005) (concluding, based on empirical
research, that the reversal rate for all appealed claim constructions from 1996 through 2003
was 34.5%).
113 Includes appeals of older decisions by Judges Heartfield, Hines and Fisher; Senior
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Thus, based on the admittedly limited appellate data, with the sole
exception of Judge Ward, the judges of the Eastern District of Texas leave a
lot to be desired in the accuracy of their patent decisions.
2. Problems with the Patent Rules
The local patent rules also stack the deck against the defendant.
Perhaps the most important Eastern District of Texas rule is a common civil
case requirement for early disclosure of all relevant documents. 114  The
effect of this rule is that a defendant in a patent infringement case only has a
few months to collect and produce all documents relevant to any claim or
defense in the case. Additionally, defendants have the same short time
frame for identifying all relevant prior art that can be used to challenge the
validity of a patent.115 Failure to produce documents or identify all relevant
prior art may preclude the use of any late-identified prior art during trial.
1 16
Because patent holders initiate most patent infringement lawsuits
(with the limited exception of declaratory judgment actions), they all the
time they desire to prepare and investigate most relevant documents before
they initiate a lawsuit. Additionally, patentees have the statutory
presumption of patent validity 117 on their side, which means that the burden
is on the defendant to establish that the patent in the suit is invalid, a
common defense strategy in many infringement actions. Defendants, on the
other hand, have a limited time to come up with theories and evidence of
invalidity; moreover, much of such evidence is oftentimes in the hands of
the patent owner who is not especially eager to share it voluntarily.
Therefore, any rules that compress discovery deadlines weaken the
defendant's position.
3. Problems with the Juries
In addition to their heightened respect for private property,
deference to government agencies and distrust of large corporations, Eastern
District of Texas juries have a number of other characteristics that make
them problematic audiences for patent infringement cases. According to the
2001 demographic profile of Harrison County, from which presumably
most of Marshall's jury pool originates, 21.6% of local residents never
114 E.D. TEX. R. Cv-26; see Mahmud, supra note 42; see also E.D.P.R. §§ 3.1-3.4
(requiring plaintiff to serve on all parties a complete "Disclosure of Asserted Claims and
Preliminary Infringement Contentions" no later than 10 days after the initial Case
Management Conference and requiring defendant to serve on all parties its "Preliminary
Invalidity Contentions" no later than 45 days thereafter).
115 See E.D.P.R. § 3.4.
116 See E.D.R.P. §3.7 (severely limiting later opportunities for amending or modifying
Infringement and Invalidity Contentions by requiring a showing of good cause).
117 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
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graduated from high school, only 15.5% have bachelor's degrees and 5.1%
hold graduate degrees. 118  The area also has a relatively large elderly
population. Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati partner M. Craig Tyler
recalled that at one of his recent trials, all the jurors were over the age of
fifty. 119 A study of jurors in two Texas counties found that Texas juries
include far fewer young adults than their proportion in the population.
20
Furthermore, according to Tyler, most jurors have only a marginal
understanding of the technology issues being litigated. 2 1 Also, unlike in
larger cities such as Austin or Dallas, where at least some of the jurors are
likely to be technologically savvy, all the potential jurors in the Eastern
District live and work in small towns and rural areas, where there are no
high-tech or academic employers at all. 122 In fact, the most tech-savvy local
people in the courtroom are often the judges.
Finally, there is the problem of the small jury pool. One of the
unfortunate byproducts of the small pool size is the inevitability that many
local jurors are often personally familiar with the local attorneys hired by
out-of-town plaintiffs to help them navigate the muddy legal waters of the
Eastern District. They go to the same barbeque parties; their children and
grandchildren attend the same public schools - in short, they are not
strangers like the big city lawyers with their funny Yankee accents. As a
result, the party that hires the most personable, well-connected local
attorney probably has the best chance of getting through to the jury and
prevailing in the case. And since patent holders initiate virtually every
patent infringement lawsuit in the Eastern District, they probably almost
always get the upper hand by having the first pick of local attorneys.
III. PROBLEMS WITH FORUM SHOPPING
In evaluating any aspect of a legal system, we must establish how
well it serves three principal goals: accuracy, fairness and administrative
efficiency. Despite its numerous technical nuances, the patent adjudication
system is no different in this respect - it too strives toward a healthy
balance of consistency, equity and administrability. It is fair to assume that,
to the extent patent forum shopping undermines any of these three goals, it
is generally damaging to the system. We will next look at each of these
goals in turn to assess the impact, if any, that forum shopping has on them.
118 MARSHALL ECON. DEV. CORP., DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HARRISON
COUNTY, TX, http://www.medco.org/demographics.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
119 See Mahmud, supra note 42.
120 See Robert C. Walters, et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional
Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 322 (2005) (finding that in Dallas and Harris counties, jury
panels are not representative of the local community because young adults make up 8% of
prospective jurors but 37% of the population).
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A. PROBLEMS WITH AccuRAcY
Accuracy is arguably the most important goal of a legal system.
Accuracy is not an absolute notion; it merely refers to the vertical
consistency between different courts. In a system built on statutes and
common law precedent, we view a trial court's decision as accurate as long
as it is in line with prior cases within the same jurisdiction and comports
with guidance from the relevant appellate courts. Once all of the available
appeals have been exhausted, any lower court's decision that has not been
reversed is considered accurate by default.
In the context of patent litigation, forum shopping was especially
rampant prior to 1982, when every federal Circuit Court had appellate
jurisdiction over patent cases litigated in its circuit. Due to a substantial
number of splits between different circuits and a relatively low number of
Supreme Court decisions in the area of patent law, plaintiff patent holders
were able to pick and choose among the many jurisdictions to suit their
particular needs. To address this serious problem, in 1982 Congress
established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was granted
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases. Having one appellate
court instead of eleven was meant to reduce the incentives for forum
shopping and provide consistent patent guidance to all district courts across
the country. 123 Patent forum shopping received two other blows when the
Supreme Court held in Markman v. Westview Instruments that issues of
claim construction were questions of law to be decided by judges instead of
juries, 124 and the Federal Circuit ruled that questions of claim construction
were to be reviewed de novo on appeal. 125 With so much critical decision
making taken away from the juries, one would think forum shopping would
soon decrease, but the much anticipated decline has yet to materialize.
There are at least two accuracy-related reasons for the remarkable
resiliency of forum shopping. First, even ten years after Markman, district
court judges are still learning to apply claim construction guidance from the
Federal Circuit in a consistent manner, and over a third of all appealed
claim constructions eventually are reversed. 126  As I have shown, the
reversal rate is no better in the Eastern District of Texas, despite the high
number of patent cases passing through its courtrooms and the fact that two
of the four judges handling patent cases have science backgrounds. Second,
even though claim constructions are now handled by judges, juries still get
123 S. REP. No. 97-275, at 4-5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14-15 (stating
that the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was intended to
provide a forum for appeals in areas of the law where Congress determined that there was
special need for national uniformity, and specifically hoping that this forum would increase
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law).
124 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996).
125 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
126 See Moore, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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to decide a number of very important patent issues such as novelty, certain
factual aspects of nonobviousness, infringement and willfulness of
infringement. For example, in order to determine nonobviousness, jurors
must put themselves in the shoes of a "person having ordinary skill in the
art" at the time of the invention. 127 This presents certain obvious problems
when the person skilled in the art is an expert in integrated circuits or a
Ph.D. in molecular biology, while the typical rural juror in East Texas has a
high school education. Thus, there still remains much room for exploiting
the inaccuracies of the system.
B. PROBLEMS WITH FAIRNESS
Fairness is another important goal of our legal system - we want
similarly situated parties to receive similar legal treatment. The integrity of
the legal system is compromised whenever parties receive disparate
treatment under the guise of fair and balanced dispute resolution. As I have
mentioned above, different federal district courts have different rules
governing patent adjudication. Some district courts allow lengthy discovery
and grant extensions with relative ease, while other courts require quick
discovery and strictly adhere to preset deadlines. Since defendants accused
of patent infringement need as much time as possible to scour the earth for
evidence of patent invalidity, they are likely to fare much better in the
former districts. On the other hand, in the absence of tight deadlines, a
wealthy corporate defendant may litigate every insignificant nuance to
death in the hope that the plaintiff runs out of money and settles the case for
less than it is worth. When they were first drafted, the patent rules in the
Northern District of California attempted to strike the right balance between
fairness to the plaintiff and fairness to the defendant. When the Eastern
District of Texas patent rules were drafted, they shifted the balance toward
the plaintiff, which has resulted in the highly distorted statistics of bench
and jury verdicts from the district.
C. PROBLEMS WITH EFFICIENCY
Administrative efficiency is the third important goal of the legal
system, often acting as a practical counterbalance to the high ideals of
accuracy and fairness. For example, the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel curtail future litigation and establish some degree of
closure, even if such closure comes at a price of potentially reduced
accuracy and fairness. Similarly, in the realm of patent litigation, we are
interested in a speedy resolution of every dispute not only because speedy
resolutions conserve judicial resources and save money for the litigants, but
also because patents have a limited lifespan. The difficulty is in striking the
right balance between resolving cases quickly and resolving them equitably.
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The argument that patent litigation has become too expensive,
costing each party on average $2,000,000, 12 is a valid one in a large
number of cases in which damage awards barely cover the cost of litigation.
The system hardly serves its purpose when legal fees consume the bulk of
the plaintiffs damages. On the other hand, many patent cases involve
potential damages of tens and sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars,
and perhaps even more importantly, injunctions threatening to shut down
entire businesses. 129 In cases of that nature, legal expenses and the speed of
resolution take second seat to reaching an accurate and fair decision,
because the district court can rest assured that an appeal will follow
regardless of the outcome. The point is that any legal system designed with
administrative efficiency in mind should provide certain exceptions for
extraordinary situations in which administrative efficiency is less important
than achieving the right result.
There is a plausible argument that patent forum shopping actually
decreases the overall efficiency of the adjudicatory system. First, forum
shopping forces parties to litigate in various remote locales, causing
additional monetary spending and personal aggravation to many of the
participants. Second, due to the small overall number of patent cases
(recently, less than 3000 per year), forum shopping deprives judges in most
districts of valuable opportunities to gain hands-on experience in this
important area of law, instead concentrating it in the hands of a relatively
small number of judges. For example, forty-three out of ninety-four federal
district courts handled less than ten patent cases per year in the last ten
years. 30 Notably, all the judges in the Western District of Louisiana, which
is the immediate eastern neighbor of the Eastern District of Texas, have
handled a total of seventy-two patent cases in the last ten years, roughly the
same number Judge Ward has handled in 2006 alone. 
131
On the one hand, this can be viewed as a positive outcome because
it allows some judges to become highly proficient patent jurists who are not
afraid of patent cases and can dispose of them in an efficient, expert
manner. On the other hand, it leaves the vast majority of remaining judges
completely unprepared for patent cases. The overall effect is probably
128 American Intellectual Property Law Association, AIPLA Report of Economic Survey
2003, 93, tbl. 22 (2003) (estimating that the median cost of a patent case with $1,000,000
to $25,000,000 at risk was $2,000,000 for each side).
129 See, e.g., Brian T. Yeh, Availability of Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases: eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., CRS REP. RS22435, May 2, 2006, available at
http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/crs/RS22435_060502.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2007)
(discussing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), and NTP Inc. v.
Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (3d Cir. 2005), two cases in which entire business
operations where threatened by patent injunctions; Research in Motion was forced to settle
for $612,500,000 to avoid having to shut down the BlackBerry wireless network).
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beneficial, since most judges would be perfectly content spending their
entire careers without seeing another patent case. 132 It is also consistent
with numerous proposals to create a specialized patent court or at least
specialized patent judges within each district court and relieve the rest of the
federal judiciary of the duty to adjudicate patent cases. I discuss these
proposals, along with several others, in greater detail below.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR PATENT ADJUDICATION REFORM
Before we start thinking about all the possible ways to improve a
legal system, we must first identify the main characteristics of the system
that are causing unwelcome results. When we discuss the reasons patent
holders engage in forum shopping, such characteristics are fairly easy to
recognize. First, patent forum shopping takes place because the venue
statute allows it. Second, patent plaintiffs shop for different venues because
many different district courts have vastly different procedural rules that
affect the odds of winning their case. Third, patent plaintiffs choose
different forums because the most convenient forum may not have judges
experienced in patent matters. Fourth, due to often vague and sometimes
inconsistent guidance from the Federal Circuit, plaintiffs may attempt to
exploit different interpretations of the patent law by different district judges.
Finally, one of the biggest reasons patent plaintiffs still shop for forums is
the fact that, under the Constitution, they are entitled to a jury trial on a
number of critically important issues. 
133
A. PATENT VENUE REFORM
One of the easiest and most obvious ways to reduce forum shopping
in patent cases would be to amend the patent statute to reverse the effect of
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. 134 As the reader may
recall from Part IA, in VE Holding the Federal Circuit held that the meaning
of corporate residence is the same in the patent and general venue statutes,
thereby rendering the patent venue statute superfluous and potentially
subjecting corporate defendants to patent litigation in every district court
having personal jurisdiction over them. 1
35
132 In the words of the colorful U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Texas
Samuel B. Kent, "Frankly, I don't know why I'm so excited about trying to bring this thing
to closure. It goes to the Federal Circuit afterwards. You know, it's hard to deal with
things that are ultimately resolved by people wearing propeller hats. But we'll just have to
see what happens when we give it to them. I could say that with impunity because they've
reversed everything I've ever done, so I expect fully they'll reverse this, too." Moore,
supra note 111, at 10 (quoting 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. 95-CV-113 (S.D. Tex. June
17, 1996) (emphasis added).
133 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
134 917 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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There are two possible ways to deal with this problem: 1) revise the
current transfer of venue statute to make it easier to transfer patent cases out
of districts having little to do with the subject matter of the litigation; and 2)
include a narrower definition of corporate residence in the patent venue
statute to distinguish it from the general venue statute. The Congressional
Judiciary Committee entertained both options in 2005, and favored the
latter. 136 The Patent Reform Act of 2006, which has not been enacted and is
not likely be addressed by Congress until late 2007, contains a provision
that defines corporate residence as "the judicial district in which the
corporation has its principal place of business or in the State in which the
corporation is incorporated."' 137 If adopted, this proposal may severely limit
the number of federal districts satisfying the venue requirement and provide
better notice to potential corporate defendants in patent cases.
B. UNIFORM PROCEDURAL RULES
As I have shown, local court rules play a very important role in
forum selection. At the present time, federal district courts are at liberty to
adopt their own procedural rules as they see fit, as long as these rules are
not in conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 138 As a result, we
have ninety-four sets of local rules that regulate the flow of patent litigation
in different districts. 139 Some of the districts, such as the Northern District
of California and the Eastern District of Texas, adopted local patent
litigation rules to make the process more predictable; others, such as the
136 See Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 9-10 (2005) (prepared statement of Kimberly A. Moore) [hereinafter Moore
Statement].
131 See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8(a) (2006).
VENUE FOR PATENT CASES.-Section 1400 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following:
(b) Any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
other than an action for declaratory judgment or an action seeking review
of a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board under chapter of title
35, may be brought only
(1) in the judicial district where either party resides; or
(2) in the judicial district where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.
(c) Notwithstanding section 1391(c) of this title, for purposes of venue
under subsection (b), a corporation shall be deemed to reside in the
judicial district in which the corporation has its principal place of
business or in the State in which the corporation is incorporated.
Id.
131 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (authorizing individual federal courts to prescribe rules for
the conduct of their business and requiring the local court rules must be consistent with
federal law and the federal rules of practice and procedure); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a).
139 For links to local court rules, see http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/distr-localrules.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
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Western District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia,
made similar rules in an open attempt to steer more patent cases toward
their courts. A large number of federal districts do not have any special
patent rules at all, which makes them appear less interested in patent cases
and therefore less attractive to plaintiff patent holders.
One way to address the problem of differences between the local
court rules would be for Congress to promulgate federal rules of patent
litigation procedure that would encapsulate the best local practices currently
in place in different districts. These federal rules should specify the
maximum lengths of time allowed for different phases of patent litigation
such as discovery and claim construction, identify special circumstances in
which extensions of time would be warranted, and delineate those
procedural areas most amenable to local rulemaking. Adopting such federal
rules would help create greater uniformity among the ninety-four federal
district courts, thereby reducing the general incentive for forum shopping in
patent cases.
C. SPECIALIZED PATENT JUDGES
The lack of patent experience and the related deficit of enthusiasm
toward patent cases among most federal district judges is another important
reason patent plaintiffs choose to travel to places like Marshall, Texas to file
their complaints. As of 2005, there were 678 authorized Article III judges,
642 active judges and 292 senior judges in the United States, not to mention
503 full-time magistrate judges. 140 Considering that only 3% of the less
than 3000 patent cases per year go to trial, in any given year we have a ratio
of about one patent trial per ten federal judges. Given the fact that these
trials are highly concentrated in a small number of districts, this means that
a large number of federal judges do not regularly preside over patent trials.
There is little doubt that this inexperience is an important factor
contributing to the 35% reversal rate of all appealed patent cases at the
Federal Circuit level, leading to more expensive and time consuming
litigation.
In order to tackle this problem, some commentators have suggested
designating at least one trial court judge in each district as a "patent judge"
and consolidating all incoming patent cases in this judge to allow him or her
to develop patent trial expertise. Professor Kimberly Moore advocated this
position during her testimony before Congress in 2005, emphasizing that
many other countries such as Germany, China, Japan, Great Britain,
Australia, New Zealand and Korea no longer have patent cases decided by
generalist judges.141 In May 2006, Representative Darrell Issa of California
introduced a bill in Congress that would establish a ten-year pilot program
140 See U.S. COURTS JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 19, tbl. I (Total Judicial
Officers).
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in at least five federal districts. Judges who opt-in to the program will be
assigned a clerk with technical expertise or expertise in patent law.
142
Under this legislation, a judge who opts-in to the program keeps every
patent case he or she is randomly assigned; in contrast, all other judges in
the district have the choice of keeping a patent case or transferring it to one
of the specialized patent judges. 143 The right to transfer a case under the
federal transfer of venue rules is preserved under this bill. 144 The bill's core
intent is to "steer patent cases to judges that have the desire and aptitude to
hear patent cases, while preserving the principle of random assignment to
help avoid forum shopping." 145 The Northern District of Virginia and the
Southern District of California (Representative Issa's home district) have
already expressed an active interest in participating in the program. 146 Five
years after the launch of the program, the Director of the Administrative
Office is expected to submit a report to the Judiciary Committee of
Congress evaluating the program and recommending whether or not to
make it permanent and national in scope. 147 The bill passed the House of
Representatives on September 28, 2006, and a companion bill was
introduced in the Senate by Senators Orin Hatch and Diane Feinstein on
September 21, 2006.148 Because the Senate failed to take action before the
close of business of the 109th Congress, Representative Issa reintroduced
the bill this year,149 and the bill passed the House unanimously on February
12, 2007. Judging by the broad support in Congress, Issa's patent bill
appears likely to become law later this year.
D. SPECIALIZED PATENT COURT
A more radical approach to solving the problem of inexperienced
patent judges is the establishment of a specialized trial court with exclusive
jurisdiction over patent infringement cases. Over a dozen foreign countries
already have this type of specialized patent trial court. 150 In recent years,
the European Union has also moved towards establishment of a single
European patent court with trial and appellate divisions. To this end, in
November 2003, representatives from several European countries drafted a
European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA) that was meant to provide a
142 See H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. § 1 (2006).
143 See id. § l(a)(1).
144 See id. § I(a)(3).
145 See Erik Larson, "Rocket Docket" Bill Introduced in Congress, IP LAW360, May 19,
2006.
146 See id
147 See supra note 142, § 1(e).
141 S. 3923, 109th Cong. (2006).
149 H.R. 34, 110th Cong. (2007).
150 See Moore Statement, supra note 136, at 9 (stating that specialized patent trial courts
exist in Germany, China, Japan, the United Kingdom., Australia, New Zealand, Singapore,
Zimbabwe, Jamaica, Kenya, Thailand, Korea and Turkey).
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single cost-effective forum for litigating all European patent disputes. An
amended and more detailed version of the draft agreement was published in
December 2005.151 In a recent assessment of the impact of the EPLA on
litigation of European patents, the European Working Party on Litigation
identified forum shopping as one of the main undesirable effects of non-
uniform patent litigation that weaken the European patent system:
152
In all instances, forum shopping between different courts
operating in legal systems which have not been harmonised is
likely to weaken the patent enforcement system, induces
unpredictability and works against the creation of a level playing
field for businesses in Europe. It also constitutes a waste of
resources as time and money are diverted from quick and fair
dispute resolution towards intricate assessments regarding which
court would best serve one party's cause and which blocking
strategies the other party should aim at.
5 3
As a default rule, the EPLA proposes that the European Patent Court have
one central court of first instance (the Central Chamber), but the creation of
regional chambers in any member state is also allowed. 154 The regional
chambers may compete with the Central Chamber for cases. In October
2006, the European Parliament backed the proposal in principle but
expressed concern over the procedural rules. In response, a group of
twenty-six European judges have unanimously agreed on rules of procedure
for the planned European patent court. 155
The proposed procedures have been characterized as "much more
continental than British," with all oral arguments designed to be concluded
in one day. 156 Unlike in the American system, no jury trials are allowed,
and the procedure is largely front-loaded, with oral arguments and evidence
presented upfront. The procedure provides for an initial meeting between
the parties and a rapporteur judge at an early stage followed by a short oral
151 The drafts are found at http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/epla/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
152 See EUROPEAN WORKING PARTY ON LITIGATION, ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF
THE EUROPEAN PATENT LITIGATION AGREEMENT (EPLA) ON LITIGATION OF EUROPEAN
PATENTS 3-4 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/epla/pdf/
impact assessment 2006 02 vl.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
151 See id. at 4.
154 See EUROPEAN WORKING PARTY ON LITIGATION, DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A EUROPEAN PATENT LITIGATION SYSTEM § 10 (Dec. 2005), available
at http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/epla/pdf/ewlO510.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2007).
155 Editorial, Judges Set Out Patent Court Principles, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Nov.
1,2006.
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procedure before a panel of at least three judges. 5 7 The draft rules propose
limited cross-examination and expert evidence, with all questioning being
controlled by the court and limited to what is strictly necessary. The
proposed rules also suggest that the judges should render their written
judgment within three months of the oral hearing, and that the court should
steer clear of producing dissenting opinions whenever possible in order to
provide clearer guidance. 5 8 If the European Commission approves the
judges' latest proposal, the European Patent Court could be established by
2010.
Court specialization at the trial level is not an entirely new concept
in the United States either. There are three specialized federal trial courts
having national jurisdiction: the Court of International Trade (CIT), the
Court of Federal Claims and the Tax Court. Additionally, the State of
Delaware is well known for its Court of Chancery, which by virtue of its
limited jurisdiction - it has no jurisdiction over criminal and tort matters -
has become a preeminent forum for corporate litigation. Some
commentators have argued that the patent field could similarly benefit from
the availability of a trial court with no jurisdiction over criminal and tort
cases to create backlogs, and a volume of litigation sufficient to develop an
efficient and expert court system.159 As in the case of the Delaware Court
of Chancery, such a court could not only resolve disputes, but also could
contribute to refinement of the patent law and trial level patent litigation
procedure so that businesses can position themselves to avoid patent
lawsuits.
One recent proposal suggested that the CIT should be given patent
and related claim jurisdiction paralleling that of the federal district courts.'
60
Factors that make the CIT an attractive candidate include its nonexistent
criminal and tort docket, Article III designation and a position as a court
within the Federal Circuit, which already has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over patent cases. 61 Because of its existing international trade
docket, the CIT would not be just a patent court, but its judges would have
the potential to develop expertise in patent law through greater exposure to
patent cases than the average district judge. However, Professor Moore
recently argued that, if a specialized trial patent court were ever created, it
would have to be given exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases rather than
concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts, since concurrent jurisdiction
would merely provide yet another forum shopping venue.
162
Of course, there are a number of problems with a specialized patent
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court With a Specialization in
Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y. 765, 781 (2000).
160 See id. at 782-86.
161 See id. at 782-83.
162 See Moore Statement, supra note 136, at 10.
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trial court. One obvious problem is that a centralized trial court could be an
inconvenient forum for localized controversies, working against the small
plaintiff who cannot afford to litigate away from home. Another commonly
perceived risk is that a highly specialized court might be "captured" by a
narrow segment of its constituency - in this case the patent bar.163 To avoid
this problem, the Federal Circuit was given appellate jurisdiction in several
specialized fields and its judges are required to rotate on different panels.
The risk is greater if a trial court is focused exclusively on patent cases. Yet
another danger is that having a single patent trial court could eliminate the
exchange of ideas that currently takes place among the various district
courts. Some believe that the patent law has a better opportunity to evolve
when multiple courts address the same issue and come up with different
substantive and procedural solutions. 164 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit can
resolve the various inconsistencies and select what it considers to be the
most optimal legal rules. However, even though having a specialized patent
court at the appellate level can achieve some of the same goals as a
specialized patent trial court, it certainly has not done enough to eliminate
or even noticeably reduce the problem of forum shopping in patent
litigation.
E. PROFESSIONAL JURIES
The United States has the dubious distinction of being the only
country in the world which allows lay juries to decide patent cases.
165
Commentators have agreed that, under the current interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment, it appears highly unlikely that the jury could ever be
entirely eliminated from patent litigation in the United States. 166 Instead,
the courts are more likely to continue to clarify and limit the right to a jury
trial in patent cases with respect to individual issues, such as infringement,
invalidity, enforceability and inequitable conduct.
However, there is a plausible alternative to lay juries: well educated,
professional, "blue-ribbon" juries familiar with the technical areas at issue.
Since the ratio of patent cases brought in different areas of technology does
not change very rapidly, one can anticipate with a fairly high degree of
accuracy the numbers of jurors needed for biotechnological,
pharmaceutical, electrical, optical, mechanical and other types of patent
cases years in advance. Having tech-savvy juries decide patent cases might
actually increase the settlement rate and decrease the number of cases going
to trial, since fewer patent holder plaintiffs would be willing to "roll the
dice" and count on the kindness of a patentee-friendly and tech-ignorant
jury.
163 See Pegram, supra note 159, at 787.
164 See Moore Statement, supra note 136, at 10.
165 See Moore Statement, supra note 136, at 9.
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Numbers suggest that professional juries are far from impossible.
Considering that each patent trial lasts from one week to one month,
averaging about two weeks, each set of twelve jurors and three alternates
could decide about twenty cases per year. Since less than 100 patent cases
go to trial every year, fewer than ten sets of jurors would be required to
satisfy the national demand. Thus, in theory, less than 150 professional
jurors could effectively replace all the thousands of confused lay jurors
currently called upon to tackle complex technological controversies. At a
somewhat conservative expense rate of $200,000 per juror, this federal
program could require about $30,000,000 per year to run, which does not
seem like that much when considering that much higher amounts are
sometimes at stake in individual patent cases. Since large corporate
defendants would be particularly interested in having a jury that
understands their technology, contributions from various trade
organizations might be used to help fund such a program.
CONCLUSION
So what is the Eastern District of Texas exactly - a guiding light for
all the other federal districts, or, as Justice Scalia put it, a "renegade
jurisdiction"'167 and the epitome of everything that is wrong with the
American system of patent adjudication? The answer, as is often the case,
is somewhere in the middle. Through a confluence of several independent
factors, the Eastern District of Texas found itself in the eye of a perfect
storm of patent litigation, amplifying the good and the bad, and highlighting
the areas in need of reform. We must view what has happened in the
Eastern District as an opportunity to learn about our patent litigation system
and understand how to make it better.
What have we learned about our patent system? We have learned
that forum shopping is alive and well, and its remarkable persistence cannot
be easily explained in terms of one, two or even three simple factors.
167 This famous quote refers to the following exchange that occurred during the oral
argument of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006):
Counsel for eBay: We're in a world where if a patent holder files a
lawsuit in Marshall, Texas, no patent has ever been declared invalid in
that jurisdiction, and no patent has ever been found not to infringe. And
then you take that finding automatically and you turn it into an injunction.
Any person who has been threatened under those circumstances and told
that we're going to face a lawsuit in Marshall, Texas is going to have a
very different negotiating posture than in a situation where -
Justice Scalia: You know, I mean, that's - that's a problem with Marshall,
Texas, not with the patent law. I mean, maybe - maybe we should
remedy that problem.... But I don't think we should write - write our
patent law because we have some renegade jurisdictions."
Oral argument transcript, eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Mar. 29, 2006,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/05-130.pdf (last
visited Apr. 24, 2007).
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Different plaintiffs look for different things in a venue. Strong plaintiffs
look for districts with educated jurors and experienced judges who are
likely to force an early settlement, or, at the very least grant a motion for
summary judgment. Weaker plaintiffs seek districts with quick trials,
patentee-friendly juries and judges who do not like to rule summarily and
do not mind taking cases all the way to trial. The ultimate choice of venue
is the result of a complex, multifactor formula, taking into account the
location, judges, juries, local court rules, speed of trial, odds of transfer,
odds of summary judgment, and ultimately the odds of winning the case.
For plaintiffs, the Eastern District of Texas provides a winning combination
of four experienced patent judges, two of whom have undergraduate
degrees in technical disciplines, favorable patent rules, which make it harder
for defendants to mount an effective defense, and largely uneducated local
juries who rule for the plaintiff 90% of the time. Combined with a very
liberal venue statute that allows suing corporate defendants in any district
which has personal jurisdiction over them, these factors resulted in an
avalanche of patent cases filed in the Eastern District in the recent years, a
trend that is not likely to reverse itself anytime soon.
While some commentators have praised the Eastern District for the
expertise of its judges, the special patent rules, and the quick adjudication of
patent disputes, others have raised concerns over the abnormally high
plaintiffs' win rate and the highly attenuated connections between many of
the litigants and the district. My empirical research has demonstrated that,
on average, the judges of the Eastern District are no better at construing
patent claims than the average district judge, despite their experience. The
speed of adjudication has gone down over the last year, so that the
difference between the Eastern District and the national average, while
statistically significant, is no longer as dramatic as it used to be. It appears
that the main reason plaintiffs flock to Marshall in growing numbers is the
perception that it would be easier to win there, thanks to all the factors
outlined above, particularly the wonderful Marshall juries.
This type of forum shopping harms the patent adjudication system in
a number of ways. First, it raises doubts about the fairness of the system
and undermines the public confidence by clearly demonstrating that "results
may vary" depending on where the complaint is filed. Secondly, it results
in a high number of appeals and reversals, thus reducing the overall
predictability of the system and leading to more expensive litigation.
Finally, it reduces the efficiency of the system by increasing monetary
spending by the litigants and depriving the majority of judges in other
federal districts of opportunities to gain hands-on experience in patent
adjudication.
Several different methods have been proposed to improve the
system of patent litigation in America, such as a fairly simple amendment of
the patent venue statute to narrow down the scope of available forums,
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specialized patent trial court, or professional juries familiar with the
technology in dispute. Clearly, some of these reform proposals are more
radical than others and less likely to gain support from Congress. However,
judging by the recently introduced bills to amend the venue statute and
designate specialized patent judges in a limited number of districts, the need
for reform is recognized on Capitol Hill, and therefore the days of Marshall,
Texas and its world-famous Fire Ant Festival dominating the patent
litigation news are likely numbered.
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